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Despite advances in recent years in the area of mandatory access control in
database systems, today’s information repositories remain vulnerable to
inference and data association attacks that can result in serious information
leakage. Without support for coping against these attacks, sensitive informa-
tion can be put at risk because of release of other (less sensitive) related
information. The ability to protect information diclosure against such impro-
per leakage would be of great benefit to governmental, public, and private
institutions, which are, today more than ever, required to make portions of
their data available for external release. In this paper we address the problem
of classifying information by enforcing explicit data classification as well as
inference and association constraints. We formulate the problem of determin-
ing a classification that ensures satisfaction of the constraints, while at the
same time guaranteeing that information will not be overclassified. We present
an approach to the solution of this problem and give an algorithm implement-
ing it which is linear in simple cases, and quadratic in the general case. We also
analyze a variant of the problem that is NP-complete. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
Key Words: security; privacy; data classification; data inference; constraint
solving; lattice.
1. INTRODUCTION
Information has become the most important and demanded resource. We live in
an internetworked society that relies on the dissemination and sharing of informa-
tion in the private as well as in the public and governmental sectors. This situation
is witnessed by a large body of research, and extensive development and use of
shared infrastructures based on federated or mediated systems [35], in which
organizations come together to selectively share their data. In addition, govern-
mental, public, and private institutions are increasingly required to make their data
electronically available. This often involves large amounts of legacy or historical
data, once considered classified or accessible only internally, that must be made
partially available to outside interests.
This information sharing and dissemination process is clearly selective. Indeed, if
on the one hand there is a need to disseminate some data, there is on the other hand
an equally strong need to protect those data that, for various reasons, should not be
disclosed. Consider, for example, the case of a private organization making avail-
able various data regarding its business (products, sales, etc.), but at the same time
wanting to protect more sensitive information, such as the identity of its customers
or plans for future products. As another example, government agencies, when
releasing historical data, may require a sanitization process to ‘‘blank out’’ infor-
mation considered sensitive, either directly or because of the sensitive information it
would allow the recipient to infer. Effective information sharing and dissemination
can take place only if the data holder has some assurance that, while releasing
information, disclosure of sensitive information is not a risk. Given the possibly
enormous amount of data to be considered, and the possible inter-relationships
between data, it is important that the security specification and enforcement
mechanisms provide automatic support for complex security requirements, such as
those due to inference channels and data association [15].
Multilevel mandatory policies, providing a simple (in terms of specification and
management) form of access control appear suitable for the problem under consider-
ation, where, in general, classes of data need to be released to classes of users. Multi-
level mandatory policies control access to information on the basis of classifications,
taken from a partially ordered set, assigned to data objects and subjects requesting
access to them. Classifications assigned to information reflect the sensitivity of that
information, while classifications assigned to subjects reflect their trustworthiness not
to disclose the information they access to subjects not cleared to see it. By controlling
read and write operations accordingly—allowing subjects to read information whose
classification is dominated by their level and write information only at levels that
dominate theirs—mandatory policies provide a simple and effective way to enforce
information protection [3, 19]. In particular, the use of classifications and the access
restrictions enforced upon them ensure that information will be released neither
directly, through a read access, nor indirectly, through an improper flow into objects
accessible by lower-level subjects. This provides an advantage with respect to
authorization-based control, which suffers from this last vulnerability.
Unfortunately, capabilities of existing classification-based (multilevel) systems
remain limited, and little, if any, support for the features mentioned above is
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provided. First, proposed multilevel database models [3] work under the assump-
tion that data are classified upon insertion (by assigning them the security level of
the inserting subject) and therefore provide no support for the classification of
existing, possibly unclassified, databases, where a different classification lattice and
different classification criteria may need to be applied. Second, despite the large
body of literature on the topic and the proposal of several models for multilevel
database systems [14, 16, 23, 26, 36], the lack of support for expressing and com-
bating inference and data association channels that improperly leak protected
information remains a major limitation [13, 15, 20]. Without such a capability, the
protection requirements of the information are clearly open to compromise. Proper
classification of data is crucial for classification-based control to effectively protect
information secrecy.
We address the problem of computing security classifications to be assigned to
information in a database system, while reflecting both explicit classification
requirements and necessary classification upgrading to prevent exploitation of data
associations and inference channels that leak sensitive information to lower levels.
We provide a uniform formal framework to express constraints on the classification
to be assigned to objects. Like others [6, 29, 30], we consider constraints that
express lower bounds on the classifications of single objects (explicit requirements)
or sets of objects (association constraints), as well as relationships that must hold
between the classifications of different objects (inference constraints). In addition,
we allow for constraints that express upper bounds on the classifications to be
assigned to objects to take into consideration visibility requirements and subjects’
existing (or prior) knowledge.
One of the major challenges in the determination of a data classification for a set
of constraints is maximizing information visibility. Previous proposals in this direc-
tion are based on optimality cost measures, such as upgrading (i.e., bringing to a
higher classification, assuming all data is at the lowest possible level, otherwise) the
minimum number of attributes or executing the minimum number of upgrading
steps [29, 30], or on explicit constraints allowing the specification of different
preference criteria [6]. Determining such optimal classifications is often an NP-
hard problem, and existing approaches typically perform exhaustive examination of
all possible solutions [6, 30]. Moreover, these proposals are limited to the consid-
eration of totally ordered sets of classifications [6, 29, 30] and intra-relation con-
straints (i.e., constraints involving attributes in a single relational table) due to
functional and multivalued dependencies [30]. While these cost-based approaches
afford a high degree of control over how objects are classified, the computational
cost of computing optimal solutions may be prohibitive. Moreover, it is generally
far from obvious how to manipulate costs to achieve the desired classification
behavior.
We introduce a notion of minimality that captures the property of a classification
satisfying the protection requirements without overclassifying data. We propose an
efficient approach for computing a minimal classification and present an algorithm
implementing our approach that executes in low-order polynomial time. We also
identify an important class of constraints, termed acyclic constraints, for which the
algorithm executes in time linear in the size of the constraints. Finally, we show that
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the problem of computing classifications becomes intractable if the set of classifica-
tion levels is not a lattice, but may be an arbitrary poset.
The technique we describe can form the basis of a practical tool for efficiently
analyzing and enforcing classification constraints. This technique can be used for
the classification of existing data repositories to be classified (or sanitized) for
external release in the design of multilevel database schemas, as well as in the
enhancement of already classified data whose classification may need to be
upgraded to account for inference attacks.
2. BASIC DEFINITIONS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Multilevel mandatory policies are based on the assignment of access classes to
objects and subjects. Access classes in a set L are related by a partial order, called
the dominance relation, denoted R , that governs the visibility of information,
where a subject has access only to information classified at the subject’s level or
below (no-read-up principle [2]). The expression aR b is read as ‘‘a dominates b,’’
and aP b (i.e., aR b and a ] b) as ‘‘a strictly dominates b.’’ The partially ordered
set (L, R ) is generally assumed to be a lattice and, often, access classes are
assumed to be pairs of the form (s, C), where s is a classification level taken from a
totally ordered set and C is a set of categories taken from an unordered set. In this
context, an access class dominates another iff the classification level of the former is
at least as high in the total order as that of the latter, and the set of categories is a
superset of that of the latter. For instance, Fig. 1a illustrates a classification lattice
with two levels (TS P S) and two categories (Army, Nuclear). For generality, we
do not restrict our approach to specific forms of lattices, but assume access classes,
to which we refer alternately as security levels or classifications, to be taken from a
generic lattice. We refer to the maximum and minimum elements of a lattice as 2
(top) and + (bottom), respectively, according to standard practice. Figure 1
depicts three classification lattices that are used to illustrate examples throughout
the paper.
FIG. 1. Examples of security lattices.
MAXIMIZING SHARING OF PROTECTED INFORMATION 499
The security level to be assigned to an attribute may depend on several factors.
The most basic consideration in determining the classification of an attribute is the
sensitivity of the information it represents. For instance, if the names of a hospital’s
patients are not considered sensitive, the corresponding patient attribute might be
labeled at a level such as Public. On the other hand, the illnesses of patients may be
considered more sensitive, and the illness attribute might be labeled at a higher
level, such as Research. Additional considerations that can affect the classification
of an attribute include data inference and association. Data inference refers to the
possiblity of determining, exactly or inexactly, values of high-classified attributes
from the values of one or more low-classified attributes. For instance, a patient’s
insurance and employer may not be considered sensitive, yet insurance and
employer together may determine a specific insurance plan. Thus, knowledge of a
patient’s insurance and employer may permit inference of at least the type of
insurance plan. If the insurance plan is considered more sensitive than either the
insurance or the employer, it may be necessary to raise the classification of either
the insurance or the employer attribute (or possibly both) to prevent access to
information that would enable inference of insurance plan. Data association refers
to the possibility that two or more attributes are considered more sensitive when
their values are associated than when either appears separately. For instance, the
fact that there is a patient named Alice may be Public, and the fact that there is a
patient whose illness is HIV may be classified at Research level, but the fact that
Alice’s illness is HIV may be considered even more sensitive (e.g., Clinical). If the
association of two or more attributes is considered more sensitive than any of the
individual attributes, the classification of at least one of the attributes must be set
sufficiently high to prevent simultaneous access to all the attributes involved in the
association.2
2Note that, in principle, association constraints could be enforced without direct classification of the
involved attributes (by run time monitoring and logging [18]). In this paper we do not consider this
hypothesis (expensive and most often infeasible in practice) and require, like others, association con-
straints to be satisfied directly on the classification of the attributes in the association.
2.1. Classification Constraints
Classification constraints specify the requirements that the security levels
assigned to attributes must satisfy. Specifically, they are constraints on a mapping
l:AW L that assigns to each attribute A ¥A a security level l ¥ L, where (L, R )
is a classification lattice. We first identify four general classes of constraints
according to the requirements they specify.
• Basic constraints specify minimum ground classifications for individual
attributes, for example, l(patient)R Public and l(illness)R Research. They
reflect the sensitivity of the information represented by individual attributes and
ensure that the attributes are assigned security levels high enough to protect the
information.
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• Inference constraints are used to prevent bypassing of basic constraints
through data inference. They require the classification of an attribute, or the least
upper bound of the classifications of a set of attributes, to dominate the classifica-
tion of another attribute. For instance, the constraint lub{l(employer), l(insurance)}
R l(plan), corresponding to the inference example from the previous discussion,
requires that the least upper bound (lub) of the levels assigned to attributes
employer and insurance dominate the level assigned to attribute plan. Note that
this constraint does indeed express the desired prevention of (low-to-high) inference
from employer and insurance to plan, since, if the constraint is satisfied, a subject
can access both employer and insurance only if the subject’s clearance level
dominates the classification of plan. It is also the weakest such constraint, allowing
the greatest possible flexibility in the assignment of classifications to employer and
insurance. In particular, it does not necessarily require the classification of either
employer or insurance to dominate that of plan. For instance, referring to the
lattice in Fig. 1c, if l(plan)=Admin the assignments l(employer)=Research
and l(insurance)=Financial satisfy the constraint, since lub{Research, Financial}
=Admin, although neither Research nor Financial dominates Admin.
• Association constraints are used to restrict the combined visibility of two
or more attributes, requiring the least upper bound of their classifications to
dominate a given ground level. For instance, the association constraint
lub{l(patient), l(bill)}R Admin requires that the least upper bound of the
classifications of patient and bill dominate Admin. Note that the same effect
could be achieved by a basic constraint requiring the classification of either
patient or bill to dominate Admin, but this alternative is in general stronger
than necessary. For instance, if patient is already classified at the Provider level
because of a basic constraint, a classification of Financial would suffice for bill.
Also, there is no need to raise the level of Patient above Admin. The explicit
association constraint is the weakest constraint form that specifies the desired
requirement.
• Classification integrity constraints are imposed by the security model
itself and have the same form as inference and association constraints. They
typically include primary key constraints and referential integrity constraints
[36]. Primary key constraints require that key attributes be uniformly classified
and that their classification be dominated by that of the corresponding non-key
attributes. Referential integrity constraints require that the classification of
attributes representing a foreign key dominate the classification of the attribu-
tes for which they are foreign key. The purpose of classification integrity con-
straints is to ensure that the view of a database visible at any given level
adheres to the data integrity constraints imposed by the data model. For
instance, if primary key constraints are not satisfied, views at certain levels
would contain null values for key attributes. Similarly, if referential integrity
constraints are not satisfied, views at certain levels would have foreign keys
with no corresponding primary key.
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The constraints in all the four categories express restrictions on the visibility of
information and can be expressed in a single general form termed lower bound con-
straints, defined formally as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Lower Bound Constraint). Let A be a set of attributes and
L=(L, R ) be a classification lattice. A lower bound constraint over A and L is
an expression of the form lub{l(A1), ..., l(An)}RX, where n > 0, Ai ¥A,
i=1, ..., n, and X is either a security level l ¥ L or is of the form l(A), with A ¥A.
If n=1, the expression may be abbreviated as l(A1)RX.
Although inference and association constraints differ in form (i.e., any inference
constraint always has the level of an attribute on its right-hand side, while any
association constraint always has a security level on its right-hand side), this dis-
tinction is not important in our classification approach, and Definition 2.1 does not
distinguish between the different classes of lower bound constraints.
Note that all constraints allowed by Definition 2.1 have the form R (as opposed
to Q ), with security levels on the right-hand side only. That is, each of them
specifies a lower bound on the classification that can be assigned to the attributes
(which can be upgraded as required by other constraints). For instance, a con-
straint requiring illness to be classified at level Research will be stated
as l(illness)R Research, implying that illness must be classified at least
Research. This interpretation is a property of the problem under consideration,
where data classification may need to be upgraded to combat inference channels
and to solve association constraints. Note that assigning to an attribute a classifi-
cation lower than that required by lower bound constraints would, directly or
indirectly, leak information to subjects not cleared for it. Thus, the main function
of lower bound constraints is to capture the requirements on classification assign-
ments that will prevent improper downward information flow.
Although lower bound constraints are sufficient for expressing the prevention of
downward information flow, it can also be useful to establish maximum levels that
should be assigned to attributes. Such maximum levels can be specified by upper
bound constraints, defined as follows.
Definition 2.2 (Upper Bound Constraint). Let A be a set of attributes and
L=(L, R ) be a classification lattice. An upper bound constraint over A and L is
an expression of the form lR l(A), where l ¥ L is a security level and A ¥A is an
attribute.
Upper bound constraints have two main uses. One is the specification of visibility
requirements, since their satisfaction ensures that the attribute will be visible to all
subjects with level dominated by the specified upper bound. For instance, if we wish
to guarantee that names of patients in a hospital are always accessible to the admi-
nistrative staff, we might impose the constraint AdminR l(patient) to prevent
the classification of patient from being raised above Admin. In fact, this con-
straint together with the lower bound constraint l(patient)R Admin effectively
forces the classification of patient to be exactly Admin. The other main use of
upper bound constraints is the modeling of subjects’ existing or prior knowledge of
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certain information stored in the database. If such knowledge is not accounted for
in the classification of the database, it is possible to produce classifications that
provide a false sense of security. For instance, suppose that providers know the ill-
nesses of patients in a hospital. This knowledge could be captured by the constraint
ProviderR l(illness). Without this constraint, it might happen that inference or
association constraints produce a higher (or incomparable) classification, say HMO,
for illness. Thus, although illness appears to be information classified at HMO,
it really is not, since providers already know the illnesses of patients. Explicit upper
bound constraints can prevent the assignment of such misleading classifications.
Lower and upper bound constraints can be represented abstractly as pairs (lhs,
rhs), where lhs is the security level or the (possibly singleton) set of attributes
appearing on the left-hand side of the constraint, and rhs is the attribute or security
level appearing on the right-hand side of the constraint. Among lower bound con-
straints we refer to constraints whose left-hand side is singleton as simple con-
straints, and to constraints with multiple elements in the left-hand side as complex
constraints. Although the definitions do not permit lub expressions on the right-
hand sides of constraints, this does not limit their expressiveness, since a constraint
of the form XR lub{l(A1), ..., l(An)} is equivalent to the set of constraints
{XR l(A1), ..., XR l(An)}. In the remainder of the paper we refer to arbitrary sets
of lower and upper bounds constraints simply as classification constraints and
distinguish between lower and upper bound constraints when necessary.
Any set of classification constraints can be viewed as a directed graph, which we
call the constraint graph, not necessarily connected, containing a node for each
attribute A ¥A and security level l ¥ L. Each simple constraint is represented in the
graph by a directed edge from the node representing the left-hand side to the node
representing the right-hand side. For complex constraints, the left-hand side is
represented by the set of nodes corresponding to the attributes on the left-hand side
of the constraint. We refer to such a set of nodes as a hypernode. The complex con-
straint is itself represented in the graph by a directed edge from the hypernode
representing the left-hand side to the node representing the right-hand side.
Figure 2 illustrates an example of a classification constraint graph, where security
levels are taken from the lattice in Fig. 1c. Circle nodes represent attributes, square
nodes represent security levels, and dashed ellipses represent hypernodes. Note that
upper bound constraints are edges from level nodes to attribute nodes. All other
edges represent lower bound constraints. The constraints refer to information in a
hospital database and reflect the following scenario. The two association con-
straints, c23 and c24, require protection of each patient’s illness and bill infor-
mation. In particular, the association between patients and their illnesses can be
known only to subjects at level Clinical or above, and the association between
patients and their bills can be known only to subjects at level Admin or above.
Other lower bound constraints reflect (precise or imprecise) inferences that can be
drawn from the data and that must therefore be reflected in the classification. For
instance, by knowing the doctor who is caring for a patient, a subject can deduce
the patient’s illness within the specific set of illnesses falling in the doctor’s spe-
cialty. Hence, the classification of attribute doctor must dominate the classification
of attribute illness (c18). Analogously, the insurance plan together with the
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health care division allows inference on doctor. Hence, subjects should have
visibility on both the division and plan only if they have visibility on doctor. In
terms of the classifications, the least upper bound of the classification of plan and
division must dominate the classification of doctor (c21). The motivation behind
the other inference constraints appearing in the figure is analogous. There are also
several basic constraints that require the classification of certain attributes to
dominate specific levels. For instance, prescriptions can be released only to
subjects at level Clinical or above (c12). In addition, there are three upper bound
constraints reflecting the fact that specific information cannot be classified above
certain levels because of required access or to account for information already
known, as discussed. For instance, the classification of patient must be dominated
by Admin (c25) and the classification of illness must be dominated by Provider
(c27). It should be noted that the constraint graph is used only informally to help
illustrate the approach. In the discussion we refer to the constraints and to their
graphical representation interchangeably, and we often refer to a constraint (lhs,
rhs) as the existence of an edge between lhs and rhs.
Among lower bound constraints we identify two subclasses of constraints. Intui-
tively, lower bound constraints whose graph representation is acyclic (i.e., is a
DAG) are called acyclic constraints, while those involved in a cycle, including cycles
FIG. 2. An example of classification constraints and corresponding classification constraint graph.
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through hypernodes,3 are called cyclic constraints. The notion of cyclic constraints
3 For the purpose of determining cycles only, the attribute on the right-hand side of a constraint is
considered reachable from every attribute on the left-hand side. Note that hypernodes never have
incoming arcs, but the attribute nodes they contain may.
is made more precise by the following definition.
Definition 2.3 (Cyclic Constraints). Let A be a set of attributes, L=
(L, R ) a classification lattice, and C a set of lower bound constraints over A and
L. C is cyclic iff it can be ordered into a sequence O(lhs1, rhs1), ..., (lhsn, rhsn)P
such that rhsi ¥ lhsi+1, 1 [ i [ n−1, and rhsn ¥ lhs1. Such a sequence is referred to as
a constraint cycle. A set of constraints C is acyclic iff no subset of C is cyclic.
A cycle involving only simple constraints is called a simple cycle. For instance,
considering only the lower bound constraints in Fig. 2, the constraints (illness,
division), ({division, plan}, doctor), and (doctor, illness) are cyclic; the
simple constraints (exam, treatment), (treatment, visit), and (visit, exam)
constitute a simple cycle; and all other lower bound constraints are acyclic.
2.2. Minimal Classification
Given a set of classification constraints, the objective is to produce a classifica-
tion l:AW L, which is an assignment of security levels in L to attributes in A,
that satisfies the constraints. A classification l satisfies a set C of constraints,
denoted l / C, iff for each constraint, the expression obtained by substituting every
l(A) with its corresponding level holds in the lattice ordering. In general, there may
exist many classifications that satisfy a set of constraints. However, not all classifi-
cations are equally good. For instance, the mapping l:AW { 2 } classifying all
data at the highest possible level satisfies any set of lower bound constraints. Such a
strong classification is clearly undesirable unless required by the classification con-
straints, as it results in unnecessary information loss (by preventing release of
information that could be safely released). Although the notion of information loss
is difficult to make both sufficiently general and precise, it is clear that a first
requirement in minimizing information loss is to prevent overclassification of data.
That is, the set of attributes should not be assigned security levels higher than nec-
essary to satisfy the classification constraints. A classification mapping that meets
this requirement is said to be minimal. To be more precise, we first extend the
notion of dominance to classification assignments. For a given set A of attributes,
classification lattice (L, R ), and mappings l1:AW L and l2:AW L, we say that
l1 R l2 iff -A ¥A : l1(A)R l2(A). The notion of minimal classification can now be
defined as follows.
Definition 2.4 (Minimal Classification). Given a set A of attributes, classi-
fication lattice L=(L, R ), and a set C of classification constraints over A and
L, a classification l:AW L is minimal with respect to C iff (1) l/ C; and (2) for
all lŒ:AW L such that lŒ / C, lR lŒS l=lŒ.
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In other words, a minimal classification is one that both satisfies the constraints
and is (pointwise) minimal in the lattice. Note that a minimal classification is not
necessarily unique. For instance, referring to the lattice in Fig. 1c, the single con-
straint lub{l(A), l(B)}R Admin has four minimal solutions, two of which classify
one attribute Public and the other Admin, while the other two solutions classify
one attribute Financial and the other Research.
The main problem now is to compute a minimal classification from a given set of
classification constraints.
Problem 2.1 (min-lattice-assignment). Given a set A of attributes to be clas-
sified, a classification lattice L=(L, R ), and a set C of classification constraints
overA andL, determine a classification assignment l:AW L that is minimal with
respect to C.
In general, a set of constraints may have more than one minimal solution. The
following sections describe an approach for efficiently computing one such minimal
solution and a (low-order) polynomial-time algorithm that implements the
approach.
3. SKETCH OF THE APPROACH
A basic requirement that must be satisfied to ensure the existence of a classifica-
tion l is that the set of classification constraints provided as input be complete and
consistent. A set of classification constraints is complete if it defines a classification
for each attribute in the database. It is consistent if there exists an assignment of
levels to the attributes, that is, a definition of l, that simultaneously satisfies all
classification constraints. Completeness is easily guaranteed by providing a default
classification constraint of the form l(A)R + for every attribute A ¥A. In addi-
tion, any set of lower bound constraints, which uses only the dominance relation-
ship R and security levels (constants) only on the right-hand side, is by itself con-
sistent, since mapping every attribute to 2 trivially satisfies all such constraints.
Analogously, any set of upper bound constraints is by itself trivially consistent.
However, a set of constraints that includes both upper and lower bound constraints
is not necessarily consistent, the simplest example of inconsistent constraints being
{l(A)R 2 , + R l(A)} (assuming that 2 and + are distinct). Given an arbitrary
set of constraints, our approach first enforces upper bound constraints to determine
a firm maximum security level for each attribute. In the process, the consistency of
the entire constraint set is checked. If the enforcement of upper bound constraints
succeeds, a second phase evaluates the lower bound constraints to determine a
minimal classification. We assume throughout that the left- and right-hand sides of
each constraint are disjoint, since any constraint not satisfying this condition is
trivially satisfied.
The remainder of this section describes the two solution phases at an intuitive
level. An algorithm implementing the approach is presented formally in the follow-
ing section.
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FIG. 3. Upper and lower bound constraints, graph, and resulting upper bounds.
3.1. Upper Bound Constraints
Upper bound constraints require the level of an attribute to be dominated by a
specific security level. Because of the transitivity of the dominance relationship and
the presence of lower bound constraints, upper bound constraints can indirectly
affect other attributes besides those on which they are specified. For instance, the
combination of upper bound constraint AdminR l(patient) and lower bound
constraint l(patient)R l(employer) forces Admin as a maximum level for attri-
bute employer as well. Intuitively, an upper bound constraint affects all the attri-
butes on those paths in the constraint graph that have the upper bound constraint
as the initial edge. Each upper bound constraint can thus be enforced by traversing
paths from security levels and propagating the constraint forward, lowering the
levels of attributes encountered along the way accordingly (to the highest levels that
satisfy the constraints). More precisely, let l be a security level on the left-hand side
of some upper bound constraint. For each edge leaving from node l to some attri-
bute node A, we propagate l forward as follows. If l dominates the current level of
A, the upper bound constraint under consideration is satisfied, and the process
terminates. If not, the level l(A) of attribute A is lowered to the greatest lower
bound ( X ) of its current value and l. A unique such level lŒ is guaranteed to exist
because we are working in a lattice. For each edge leaving from A, level lŒ is pro-
pagated to the node on which that edge is incident. Also, for each edge leaving from
a hypernode that contains A, the least upper bound lœ of the levels of all the attri-
butes in the hypernode is propagated to the node reached by that edge. Propagating
a level lŒ to an attribute node AŒ means lowering l(AŒ) to the greatest lower bound
of its current level and lŒ, and proceeding recursively on all edges leaving from AŒ or
from hypernodes containing it as just described. This process terminates for each
path when a leaf node (security level) is reached. Then, if the level being propagated
dominates the level of the leaf node, the process terminates successfully for the
upper bound constraint being considered. Otherwise, an inconsistency in the con-
straints has been detected. In this case the process terminates with failure.4
4 In principle, the actions executed in this forward propagation process could be rescinded and the
upper bound constraint ignored, pointing out the inability to satisfy it.
The example in Fig. 3 provides a simple illustration of the upper bound compu-
tation. Initially, the level of each attribute is set to HMO ( 2 ). There is only one
upper bound constraint, ProviderR l(illness). Propagating level Provider
forward causes l(illness) to be lowered to HMO X Provider=Provider.
Likewise, Provider is propagated to division as a result of the constraint
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l(illness)R l(division), lowering l(division) to Provider. Next, the con-
straint l(division)R Public is checked and found to be satisfied, since
ProviderR Public. Similarly, the constraint lub{l(division), l(plan)}R l(doctor)
is found to be satisfied, since the least upper bound of Provider and HMO is HMO,
which dominates l(doctor)=HMO. Finally, the remaining constraint on illness,
l(illness)R Research is checked and found to be satisfied, and the upper bound
computation succeeds with the upper bounds as shown in the figure. Note that if we
were to replace the upper bound constraint with FinancialR l(illness), for
example, the process would fail upon checking l(illness)R Research, since
FinancialR Research is false.
3.2. Lower Bound Constraints
Upon successful completion of the enforcement of upper bound constraints, the
maximum allowed security level for each attribute is known, and the upper bound
constraints require no further consideration. The second phase thus deals exclusively
with lower bound constraints to determine a minimal classification. Among lower
bound constraints we consider separately the acyclic and cyclic constraints (see Defi-
nition 2.3). The reason for considering them separately is that acyclic constraints,
which are expected to account for most constraints in practice, can be solved using a
simpler and more efficient approach than that needed for cyclic constraints.
3.2.1. Acyclic Constraints
A straightforward approach to computing a minimal classification involves per-
forming a backward propagation of security levels to the attributes. Consider an
acyclic constraint graph with no hypernodes (simple constraints only). Starting
from the leaves, we traverse the graph backward (opposite the direction of
the edges) and propagate levels according to the constraints. Intuitively, propagat-
ing a level to an attribute node A according to a set of constraint edges
{(A, X1), ..., (A, Xn)} means assigning to A the least upper bound of all levels
represented by X1, ..., Xn. Note that, because of the successful termination of the
upper bound phase, this least upper bound is guaranteed to be dominated by the
level assigned in the upper bound phase. As long as each Xi is guaranteed to remain
fixed, propagating levels in this way ensures that A is assigned the lowest level that
satisfies all constraints on it. Thus, for acyclic simple constraints the unique,
minimal solution can be computed simply by propagating levels back from the
leaves, visiting all the nodes in (reverse) topological order.
As an example, consider the simple constraints and the corresponding constraint
graph in Fig. 4. Applying the process just outlined, we first propagate level Public
to visit and level Research to illness. With the final levels for visit and
illness now known, we next propagate the least upper bound of Public,
l(visit), and l(illness) to treatment, thus classifying it Research. Finally, we
propagate the least upper bound of l(treatment) and Clinical, to prescription,
classifying it Clinical. The resulting minimal solution is shown in Fig. 4.
This process is clearly the most efficient one can apply, since each edge is tra-
versed exactly once. In terms of the constraints, this corresponds to evaluating the
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FIG. 4. Acyclic simple constraints, corresponding graph, and minimal solution.
constraints in a specific order, evaluating each constraint only once, when the level
of its right-hand side becomes definitely known, and modifying the left-hand side
accordingly.
In a set of acyclic constraints, the propagation method described for simple con-
straints alone requires only minor adaptation to handle complex constraints as well.
The key observation is that a complex constraint can be solved minimally by
choosing any single attribute on the left-hand side and assigning it a minimal level
that satisfies the constraint, provided that neither the level of the right-hand side
nor the levels of any other attributes on the left-hand side are later altered. Intui-
tively, this corresponds to enforcing the constraint on the attribute in the hypernode
whose classification is computed last. As long as the constraints are acyclic, there
exists an order of constraint evaluation (security level back-propagation) that
ensures that the security levels of all attributes involved in a complex constraint are
known prior to the selection of one for minimal assignment. For instance, consider
the constraints in Fig. 5. The complex constraint lub{l(bill), l(patient)}R
Admin (c24) can be solved by assigning either Admin to bill or Research to
patient. Note that either solution is minimal according to Definition 2.4. The par-
ticular minimal solution generated depends on the order of constraint evaluation.
For the example in Fig. 5, the first solution ({l(bill)=Admin; l(patient)=Public})
is computed if the simple constraint on patient (c5) is evaluated first, whereas the
second solution ({l(bill)=Financial; l(patient)=Research}) is computed if
the simple constraint on bill (c9) is evaluated first.
3.2.2. Cyclic Constraints
For cyclic constraints the simple back-propagation of security levels is not
directly applicable, and it is not clear whether the method can be adapted easily to
deal with arbitrary sets of cyclic constraints. Simple cycles, that is, cycles involving
only simple constraints, are easily handled since they imply that all attributes in the
cycle must be assigned the same security level—we can simply ‘‘replace’’ the cycle
FIG. 5. Acyclic (simple and complex) constraints, graph, and minimal solutions.
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by a single node whose ultimate level is then assigned to each of the original attri-
butes in the cycle. For instance, we might imagine replacing the simple cycle
involving attributes exam, treatment, and visit in Fig. 2 by a single node labeled
‘‘exam, treatment, visit’’ and proceeding as before. However, when complex
constraints are involved in a cycle, the problem becomes more challenging. Recall
that a complex constraint can be solved minimally by selecting any left-hand-side
attribute on which to impose the constraint, provided that the level of no other
attribute in the constraint subsequently changes. For cyclic complex constraints, it
can be difficult to ensure that this requirement is satisfied. We might impose a level
on one attribute A on the left-hand side of a complex constraint only to find that a
higher level is propagated through a cycle to another attribute AŒ in the same con-
straint. The constraint remains satisfied, but the resulting classification may not be
minimal, since the original assignment to A may have been higher than necessary
for satisfaction of the constraint.
In many cases it may be possible to determine a priori an order of constraint
evaluation and a unique candidate on which to impose each complex constraint
that guarantees a minimal classification using back-propagation. However, as the
cycles become more complicated, the determination of such attributes becomes
more complex. The problem becomes particularly acute for cyclic complex con-
straints whose left-hand sides are nondisjoint, since the choice of one attribute
for one constraint may invalidate the choice made for another. For instance,
consider the following two constraints from Fig. 2: ({patient, bill}, Admin),
({illness, patient}, Clinical). Assigning level Admin to patient to satisfy the
first constraint automatically satisfies the second constraint, implying that the
second constraint must also be imposed on patient. Moreover, it is not generally
possible to choose a single attribute in the intersection of two or more left-hand
sides on which to impose all the intersecting constraints. As an example, consider
three constraints whose left-hand sides are {A, B}, {B, C}, and {A, C}, respectively.
Two attributes appearing together in the left-hand side of one of these constraints
will necessarily have a constraint imposed on them. The result in such a case can
still be minimal. However, it can be far from clear whether any two attributes will
do, and if not, which two should be chosen, when such intersecting constraints are
entangled in a complex cycle.
Since it is difficult, at best, to ensure that no level assignment performed during
back-propagation of levels through cycles involving complex constraints will ever
be invalidated, we appear to be left with essentially two alternatives: (1) augment
the back-propagation approach with backtracking capabilities for reconsidering
and altering assignments that result in nonminimal classifications, or (2) develop a
different approach for computing minimal classifications from cyclic constraints.
We would of course prefer a method that is as close as possible in computational
efficiency to the simple level propagation for acyclic constraints. Thus, we reject
alternative (1), since the worst-case complexity of a backtracking approach is pro-
portional to the product of the sizes of the left-hand sides of all constraints in the
cycle. Instead, we develop a new approach to be applied to sets of cyclic constraints.
This new approach begins with all attributes involved in a cycle at high security
levels, and then attempts to lower the level of each such attribute incrementally as
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long as all affected constraints remain satisfied. More specifically, assume that we
are given a set of cyclic constraints and that every attribute in the cycle is initially
assigned the highest classification allowed by the upper bound constraints. For each
attribute A involved in the cycle, we attempt to lower the level of A, one step at a
time along an arbitrary path down the lattice. At each step we check whether
lowering the level of A would violate any constraints, as follows. For each con-
straint on A, we check whether the level of the left-hand side would still dominate
that of the right-hand side if A were to be assigned the lower level. If the constraint
would still be satisfied, we continue and try an even lower level for A. Otherwise, we
check whether the level of the right-hand side can also be lowered so that the con-
straint is again satisfied. If the right-hand side is definitively assigned (a ground
level or an attribute whose level is already determined), and therefore cannot be
lowered, we fail. Otherwise, the right-hand side is another attribute AŒ, and we then
attempt (recursively) to lower the level of AŒ. If, finally, the attempted lowering of A
from a level l1 to a level l2 fails, the lowering is attempted again along a different
path down the lattice from l1. The last level for which lowering A succeeds is A’s
final level. Repeating this procedure for each attribute, the result at the end of the
entire process is a minimal classification for all attributes in the cycle.
For a simple illustration of this procedure, consider the constraint set in Fig. 6,
which contains a cyclic subset (c18, c20, c21). Assume that all four attributes in the
cycle (division, doctor, illness, and plan) are initially labeled at level HMO
( 2 ). To enforce the cyclic constraints, we select an arbitrary attribute, say
illness, from the cycle and attempt to lower its level. We may try either Admin or
Provider, and we choose Admin arbitrarily. We can lower l(illness) to Admin
as long as all affected constraints remain satisfied. The first constraint on illness
remains satisfied, since AdminR Research. The second constraint on illness
remains satisfied only if l(division) can also be lowered to Admin. Attempting to
lower l(division) to Admin, we find the simple constraint on division (c6)
remains satisfied, and the complex constraint (c21) as well, since l(plan) is HMO. It
is easy to see, then, that l(illness) and, consequently, l(division) can be
lowered ultimately to Research. Suppose now that we attempt to lower
l(division). Since l(division)=Research we may try Public and find that both
c6 and c21 remain satisfied. Finally, we attempt to lower l(doctor). We first try
level Admin and find that the simple constraints on doctor (c4 and c18) remain
satisfied, since AdminR Public and AdminR l(illness)=Research. We now
try to lower l(doctor) to Financial. This attempt fails because constraint c18
remains satisfied only if l(illness) can be lowered to Public. This is not possible
because of the constraint l(illness)R Research (c11). We then try to lower
l(doctor) to Clinical and succeed. Subsequently, we try to lower l(doctor) to
Research. Again constraints c4 and c18 remain satisfied, and so in the last step of
the process we try to lower l(doctor) to Public. As before, this attempt fails
because it would require l(illness) to be lowered to Public as well, which cannot
be done. Once the cyclic constraints have been solved plan is assigned level Admin,
which is the lowest level that it can assume without violating the dominance con-
straints imposed on it, namely lub{l(division), l(plan)}R l(doctor) (c21) and
l(plan)R Financial (c8). The computed minimal solution appears in Fig. 6.
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FIG. 6. Cyclic constraints, constraint graph, and a minimal solutions.
Unlike the back-propagation method, which is applicable only to acyclic con-
straints, the incremental, forward-lowering approach is applicable to all constraints.
However, it is not generally as efficient, although its complexity remains low-order
polynomial. Thus, it is preferable to apply the simple back-propagation method
wherever possible and reserve the forward-lowering approach for sets of cyclic con-
straints. The following section describes an algorithm that elegantly combines the
two approaches for greatest efficiency on arbitrary sets of constraints.
4. ALGORITHM
At a high level, the algorithm implementing our approach consists of four main
parts. In the first part, we identify sets of cyclic constraints to be evaluated with the
forward lowering approach and determine the order in which attributes (sets of
attributes in the case of cyclic constraints) will be considered for both the upper and
lower bound constraint solving phases. The second part enforces upper bound con-
straints and, in the process, checks the entire input constraint set for consistency.
The third and fourth parts represent, respectively, the back-propagation method for
acyclic constraints and the forward lowering method for cyclic constraints. These
two components operate alternately according to whether or not the attribute under
consideration is involved in a cycle. The procedures embodying the different parts
of the approach are presented formally in Figs. 7–11. Here we describe them
informally.
We assume that the input constraint set C is partitioned into two sets: Cupper, the
upper bound constraints, and Clower, the lower bound constraints. The upper bound
constraints are considered only in the computation of upper bounds for the security
levels of attributes (procedure compute_upper_bounds), while lower bound con-
straints are considered in all phases of the algorithm. To begin the algorithm, pro-
cedure main (Fig. 7) initializes several variables that are used either during the DFS
procedures or in the actual classification process, as follows. For each attribute A,
Constr[A] is the set of (lower bound) constraints whose left-hand side includes
attribute A, visit[A] is used in the graph traversal to denote if A has been visited,
and done[A] is set to true when A becomes definitively labeled. For each security
level l ¥ L, we set done[l] to true, since security levels are constants, and visit[l] to
1, since security levels are leaves in any (lower bound) constraint graph and thus
represent terminal points in any traversal of the graph. With each constraint
c ¥ Clower, we associate a count, count[c], initialized to the number of attributes in
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FIG. 7. Main algorithm for computing a minimal classification.
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the left-hand side of c, and used during the computation of a solution to keep track
of the number of attributes in the left-hand side of c remaining to be considered (in
various phases of the algorithm).
Next, main proceeds to its primary task, which is to determine an ordering of the
attributes that both identifies cyclic relationships and captures the order in which
attributes will be considered when evaluating the classification constraints on them.
This ordering reflects possible dependencies between the security levels of the attri-
butes, as specified by the lower bound constraints, and is a total order over sets of
attributes. Two attributes whose levels may be mutually dependent are part of a
constraint cycle and are considered equivalent in terms of the attribute ordering.
Intuitively, the security level of one attribute depends on that of a second attribute
if the second is reachable from the first in the constraint graph. For the purpose of
determining reachability only, we interpret each edge from a hypernode to a node as
a set of edges, one from each attribute in the hypernode to the node. For instance,
in the constraint lub{l(division), l(plan)}R l(doctor) in Fig. 6, we would
consider doctor to be reachable from either division or plan. This interpretation
reflects the fact that the security levels of either division or plan may depend on
the level of doctor. Using this interpretation of reachability, then, attributes
involved in cyclic constraints correspond to those in strongly connected compo-
nents (SCCs) of the constraint graph. More formally, we define SCCs as disjoint
sets of attributes involved in constraint cycles (Definition 2.3), as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Strongly Connected Component). Let A be a set of attri-
butes, L=(L, R ) a classification lattice, and C a set of lower bound constraints
overA andL. A strongly connected component (SCC) of C is a nonempty subset of
A having the following properties:
1. Every attribute A ¥A is a member of exactly one SCC.
2. Any two distinct attributes A1, A2 ¥A belong to the same SCC if and only
if there exist constraints (lhs1, A1) ¥ C and (lhs2, A2) ¥ C and a constraint cycle
CŒ ı C such that (lhs1, A1) ¥ CŒ and (lhs2, A2) ¥ CŒ.
In other words, the SCCs of a constraint set partition the attributes, and each
SCC is the collection of attributes on the right-hand sides of a maximal set of cyclic
constraints (which may include constraints in intersecting or overlapping constraint
cycles).
Constraint cycles can therefore be identified by applying known methods for
identification of SCCs. If we think of each such SCC as a kind of node (or node
group) itself, the attribute order we seek is essentially the topological order of the
attribute nodes (in the case of acyclic constraints) and SCCs in the constraint
graph. Once computed, this order is used to guide the evaluation of both upper and
lower bound constraints.
The computation of the attribute ordering is accomplished through an adapta-
tion of known approaches to SCC computation involving two passes of the graph
with a depth first search (DFS) traversal [4, 32] of the lower bound constraints.
The first pass (dfs_visit) executes a DFS on the constraints, recording each attribute
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in a stack (Stack) as its visit is concluded. The second pass (dfs_back_visit) con-
siders attributes in the order in which they appear in Stack, assigning each to the
SCC list scc[max_scc] (where max_scc is incremented as each attributed is visited)
and marking the attribute as visited. The SCCs are maintained as lists rather than
sets so that the attributes within an SCC can be processed in a predictable order in
other parts of the algorithm. For each new attribute A popped from Stack, the
process walks the graph backward with a (reverse) DFS and adds to the SCC list
containing A all attributes it finds still unvisited, since such attributes are neces-
sarily part of the SCC containing A. Each SCC satisfies the following properties: (1)
each attribute is a member of exactly one SCC, (2) any two attributes belong to the
same SCC if and only if they appear together in a cycle (i.e., are mutually reach-
able), and (3) the index of the SCC to which any attribute belongs is no greater
than that of any attribute reachable from it (i.e., on which it depends). As an










FIG. 8. Procedures for enforcing upper bound constraints.
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FIG. 9. Computation of upper bound of complex constraints.
After initialization and SCC computation, main initializes each attribute’s classi-
fication to 2 and concludes by invoking the constraint solving procedures
compute_upper_bounds (Fig. 8), compute_partial_lubs (Fig. 9), and compute_
minimal_solution (Fig. 10).
Procedure compute_upper_bounds constitutes the process for enforcing upper
bound constraints outlined in Section 3.1. The first step directly evaluates each
upper bound constraint by assigning to the constrained attribute the greatest lower
bound ( X ) of its current level and the level specified by the constraint. The
remainder of the procedure then propagates the enforced upper bounds throughout
the (lower bound) constraint graph. This propagation considers each attribute in
increasing SCC index order, since the upper bound of some attribute can affect the
upper bounds only of attributes of equal or higher SCC index, and thus, the
number of traversals is minimized. As each attribute is considered, its upper bound
is propagated to other attributes, via procedure upper_bound. As upper_bound pro-
cesses each constraint c on an attribute, it decrements count[c]. The level of the left-
hand side is then propagated to the right-hand side only if the count has reached 0,
or the attribute on the right-hand side is in the same SCC. Such delayed propaga-
tion optimizes the processing of acyclic constraints, since the SCC index of the right-
hand side attribute of any acyclic constraint is higher than that of any attribute on
the left-hand side. Only after the last attribute in the left-hand side has been pro-
cessed is it necessary to propagate the level forward.
By considering all attributes in increasing SCC index order, we ensure that all
upper bounds are eventually propagated through the graph (or found to violate the
consistency requirement). Within a cycle (SCC), each upper bound is propagated
(procedure upper_bound) only as far as necessary—the process terminates along any
path in which the upper bound is already satisfied. To ensure that all upper bounds
are eventually propagated throughout the cycle, procedure compute_upper_bounds
calls upper_bound on all unvisited attributes in the cycle. This process guarantees
that, even if constraints propagate upper bounds (from attributes of lower SCC
index) into a cycle at several points, every upper bound will be propagated as far as
necessary. Note that the level assigned to any attribute can always be lowered as
much as required by any upper bound propagated into the attribute. Propagation
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FIG. 10. Lower bound constraint enforcement.
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failure can occur only when security levels (leaf nodes) are reached and the incom-
ing upper bound does not dominate the level of the leaf node. Such failure indicates
that the upper bound constraint that originated the failed propagation is inconsis-
tent with the lower bound constraints. If compute_upper_bounds completes success-
fully, we know that the constraints are consistent and that the computation of a
minimal solution will be successful (Theorem 5.1). The upper bound constraints
need no further consideration.
The purpose of compute_partial_lubs is to precompute, or cache, the least upper
bounds (lubs) of the levels of certain subsets of attributes. These caches of ‘‘partial
lubs’’ are used in procedure minlevel (called by compute_minimal_solution) to
compute quickly the lub of the current levels of all attributes, except the attribute
currently being processed, in the left-hand side of an arbitrary constraint. The
computation of the partial lubs is designed to take advantage of the fact that attri-
butes in the left-hand side of an acyclic constraint are processed in a predictable
and consistent order (the SCC index order determined by the DFS procedures). For
each lower bound constraint c of the form (lhs, rhs), |lhs|+2 partial lubs are com-
puted. At the conclusion of compute_partial_lubs (the initialization phase),
the first and last partial lub entries for each constraint are each set to + ,
and each remaining partial lub Plub[c][i] for constraint c is the least upper
bound of the levels of all attributes from SCC index 1 up to i. Later, in
compute_minimal_solution, the attributes will be processed in reverse SCC index
order. As the final assignment for each attribute is determined, its corresponding
partial lub entry for each constraint will be recomputed so that its value is the least
upper bound of its own level and the levels of all other attributes in the left-hand
side already processed (whose partial lub entries correspond to higher index values).
The net effect of the precomputation of partial lubs (by compute_partial_lubs) and
their later recomputation in compute_minimal_solution is to maintain the following
property: for any constraint c=(lhs, rhs), when the ith attribute of lhs is pro-
cessed in compute_minimal_solution, the least upper bound of the current levels of
all other attributes in lhs is equal to the least upper bound of Plub[c][i−1] and
Plub[c][i+1].
Procedure compute_minimal_solution integrates the two approaches (back-prop-
agation as outlined in Section 3.2.1 and forward lowering as outlined in Sec-
tion 3.2.2) for determining a minimal solution for lower bound constraints. Unlike
compute_upper_bounds it considers attributes in decreasing order of SCC index.
That is, compute_minimal_solution traverses the constraint graph from the leaves
back, rather than from the roots forward. For each attribute A at the SCC index
being considered, all constraints in Constr[A] are processed as follows. For each
constraint c whose right-hand side is definitively labeled (done[rhs]=true), the
procedure determines how to enforce the constraint on A. If c is simple (|lhs|=1),
the level of the right-hand side is accumulated via the least upper bound ( c )
operation into variable l (initialized to + ). Otherwise, c is complex, and minlevel is
called to compute a minimal level that A must dominate (accounting for the current
levels of the other attributes on the left-hand side of the constraint) and still satisfy
the constraint. Procedure minlevel first computes the least upper bound of the levels
of all other attributes (lubothers) by using the precomputed partial lubs. If A is the
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jth attribute on the left-hand side to be processed, the lub of the other levels is
simply the lub of the partial lubs Plub[c][j−1] and Plub[c][j+1]. Next, minlevel
computes a minimal level for A that maintains satisfaction of c by descending the
lattice along a path from A’s current level, one level at a time, stopping at the
lowest level found whose direct descendants would all violate the constraint if
assigned to A.5 The returned level is then accumulated via a lub operation into l. If
5 In the generally assumed case of classification lattices whose elements are pairs consisting of a classi-
fication level (taken from a totally ordered set) and a set of categories [25] (e.g., Fig. 1a) the minimum
level to be assigned to A can be computed directly without the need of walking through the lattice. In
this case, the entire else branch of the minlevel procedure can in fact be substituted with the simple com-
putation, If (lubothersl < rhsl) then last :=Orhsl, rhsc 0 lubotherscP else last :=O + , rhsc 0 lubotherscP,
where rhsl (lubothersl resp.) is the classification level of rhs (lubothers resp.) and rhsc (lubothersc resp.) the
corresponding set of categories.
all the constraints in Constr[A] have the right-hand side done (which is always the
case for acyclic constraints), A is simply assigned the level l so computed. Intui-
tively, this corresponds to enforcing back-propagation of security levels.
If, on the other hand, there is at least one constraint on A whose right-hand side
is not definitively labeled (done[rhs]=false), then attribute A must be involved in
a constraint cycle. In this case, compute_minimal_solution proceeds by performing
the forward lowering computation starting from A. At the start of this computa-
tion, level l represents a lower bound on A’s final level. Thus, A must eventually be
assigned a level somewhere between its current level (which must be at least as high
as l if the constraints are consistent) and l. We know that the constraints are
satisfied with A at its current level, so the incremental forward lowering process
begins by computing the set of levels (DSet) immediately below l(A) in the lattice.
A member lœ of this set is chosen arbitrarily, and try_to_lower checks whether A
can be lowered to level lœ. Procedure try_to_lower (Fig. 11) takes an attribute A and
a level l and returns a set of attribute/level pairs that represent a satisfactory (but
possibly non-minimal) assignment of levels to attributes that allows A to be lowered
to l while maintaining satisfaction of all constraints. If no such assignment exists,
try_to_lower returns the empty set to indicate failure. In the event that try_to_lower
succeeds, compute_minimal_solution proceeds to enforce all level assignments (in set
Lower) returned by try_to_lower. It then continues to attempt lowering the level of
A from the most recent point of success. In the event that try_to_lower fails,
another level to try is chosen from DSet. If all levels in DSet are tried and fail
(DSet=”), the current level assigned to A is a minimal level for A that maintains
satisfaction of all constraints. Note that the condition DSet=” must eventually
become true, either because all attempts at lowering fail, or because + is reached.
Note also that when a lowering attempt succeeds for some level in lœ ¥ DSet, it is
not necessary to consider any other level in DSet. That is, a minimal level for A will
always be found by considering only levels lower than the level that last succeeded.
This point is discussed in more detail in the correctness proof for the algorithm.
The keys to the operation of procedure try_to_lower are the sets Tocheck and
Tolower. Tocheck is the set of attribute/level pairs that remain to be checked to
determine success or failure of the lowering attempt. Tolower is the set of attribute/
level assignment pairs that must ultimately be enforced if the lowering attempt
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FIG. 11. Procedure try_to_lower.
succeeds. Now, for a given call try_to_lower(A, l), Tocheck is initialized to (A, l)
and Tolower to ”, since it is the attempt to lower the level of A to l that must be
checked, while no assignments are yet implied by the attempted lowering. The pro-
cedure continues as long as there are assignments to check. The checking process
amounts to propagating levels forward through the constraint graph, maintaining
additional lowerings found to be necessary in set Tocheck, moving them then to set
Tolower for their later enforcement, if they do not result in any constraint violation.
In the event of a constraint violation, try_to_lower fails immediately, returning the
empty set. Otherwise, it returns the set Tolower containing the assignments found to
be necessary to enable the level of attribute A to be lowered to l.
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FIG. 12. Classification contraints, constraint graph, and classification lattice of our working
example and values produced by the classification process.
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Note that in the forward-lowering process, the level propagated forward may
change and become either higher or lower because of complex constraints. The level
can increase when traversing a complex constraint, because in this case we require
only that the right-hand side is dominated by (i.e., lowered to) the level of the lub of
all the attributes in the left-hand side. The level can also decrease when, traversing a
complex constraint, we would require rhs to be dominated by (lowered to) a level
FIG. 13. Execution of the classification process on the constraint of Fig. 12.
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incomparable to its current level or the level recorded for it in either Tocheck or
Tolower. In this case, the process can succeed only if the attribute is dominated by
both levels, that is, if it can be lowered to their greatest lower bound. We therefore
record this required assignment to be checked (in Tocheck) and propagate the level
forward.
Once a minimal level has been computed for any attribute A, compute_
minimal_solution updates the partial lubs in which l(A) is involved to keep the
partial lubs correct with respect to l, as described earlier.
Example 4.1. Figure 12 displays the set of constraints of Fig. 2 and their
evaluation by the classification process. For the reader’s convenience, the corre-
sponding classification graph and the classification lattice are also shown. The table
at the bottom of the figure reports for each attribute A, the set of lower bound
constraints imposed on it (Constr[A]), the SCC to which it belongs as computed by
main, and its security level at initialization, after the enforcement of the upper
bound constraints (procedure compute_upper_bounds), and after the enforcement of
the lower bound constraints (procedure compute_minimal_solution). The execution
of the two procedures is illustrated in Fig. 13. Table compute_upper_bounds illus-
trates the effects of the procedure for the different values of variable i (ranging over
the SCC index in increasing order) and variable A (ranging over all the attributes
within each SCC). For each such iteration, the table reports the calls to procedure
upper_bound (where recursive calls are indented) together with the level assignment
updates caused by them and the constraint whose evaluation caused the update
(column c). The top portion of the table (with no entries for i) describes the initial
direct enforcement of upper bound constraints on the constrained attribute.
The second table illustrates the execution of procedure compute_minimal_solution
for the different values of variable i (ranging over the SCC index in decreasing
order) and variable A (ranging over all the attributes within each SCC). For
changes due to back-propagation (A is involved only in acyclic constraints), the
table reports the change to A’s level and the constraints that caused that change,
which are all the constraints with A on the left-hand side (i.e., Constr[A]). For
changes due to forward propagation (A is involved in a cycle), the table reports the
calls to procedure try_to_lower together with the level updates caused by them and
the constraints (column c) that forced the updates. For unsuccessful calls to
try_to_lower, value ” is reported in the last column of the table, while column c
reports the constraint that caused the failure (because it could not be satisfied).
5. CORRECTNESS AND COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In this section we state the correctness of our approach and discuss its complex-
ity. Proofs of the theorems appear in the Appendix.
Theorem 5.1 (Correctness). Algorithm 4.1 solves Problem 2.1 (min-lattice-
assignment). That is, given a set C of classification constraints over a set A of
attributes and a classification latticeL=(L, R ), Algorithm 4.1 generates a minimal
classification mapping l:AW L satisfying C.
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Complexity. In the complexity analysis we adopt the following notational con-
ventions with respect to a given instance (A,L, C) of min-lattice-assignment:
NA (=|A|) denotes the number of attributes in A; NL (=|L|) denotes the total
number of security levels in L; NC (=|C|) denotes the number of constraints in C;
S=; (lhs, rhs) ¥ C (|lhs|+1) denotes the total size of all constraints in C; H denotes the
height of L; B denotes the maximum number of immediate predecessors (‘‘branch-
ing factor’’) of any element in L; c denotes the maximum cost of computing the
least upper bound or greatest lower bound of any two elements in L. Define M to
be maximum, for all paths from the top to the bottom of a lattice, of the sum of the
branching factor of each element of the path. M is no greater than BH, and is also
no greater than the size ofL (number of elements+size of the immediate successor
relation).
Theorem 5.2 (Complexity). Algorithm 4.1 solves any instance (A,L, C) of the
problem min-lattice-assignment in O(NASHMc) time, and, if the set of constraints
C is acyclic, in O(SMc) time. Therefore, min-lattice-assignment is solvable in
polynomial time.
Note, in particular, that the time taken by Algorithm 4.1 is linear in the size of
the constraints for acyclic constraints, and no worse than quadratic for cyclic con-
straints. Whether the complexity for the cyclic case can be improved to linear in the
size of the constraints remains an open question. However, the complexity bound
above for the cyclic case is truly worst case—it assumes that the entire constraint set
forms a single SCC, which rarely occurs in practice. For any instance of the
problem, the acyclic complexity analysis applies to all acyclic portions of the con-
straint set. In Algorithm 4.1 the higher price is paid only for cyclic constraints,
which typically include only a small portion of the input constraint set.
The cost of lattice operations. An important practical consideration is the effi-
ciency of lattice computations. Previous work [31] has shown that constant-time
testing of partial orders can be accomplished through a data structure requiring
O(n`n) space and O(n2) time to construct, where n is the number of elements in
the poset. Encoding techniques [1, 9] are known that enable near constant-time
computation of lubs/glbs, so that c in the above analysis can be taken as constant,
at the expense of additional preprocessing time. In practice, one would expect to
use the same classification lattice over many different instances of min-lattice-
assignment, so that the additional preprocessing cost for lattice encoding is less of
a concern. Finally, we note that the generally considered classification lattices with
access classes represented by pairs classification and a set of categories can be effi-
ciently encoded as bit vectors that enable fast testing of the dominance relation and
lub and glb computations. The limited number of levels (16) and categories (64)
required by the standard [8] allows the encoding of any security level in a small
number of machine words, effectively yielding constant-time lattice operations.
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6. RETURNING A PREFERRED MINIMAL SOLUTION
As noted in Section 3.2.1, minimal solutions are generally not unique, since
complex lower bound constraints can be solved minimally by assigning, if neces-
sary, any one attribute on the left-hand side a sufficiently high level. The approach
presented returns one minimal solution, where the particular solution returned
depends both on the (fixed) topological order of attribute nodes and cycles that
guides the back-propagation of security levels and on the (arbitrary) order in which
constraints are evaluated within cycles. Not all minimal solutions to a set of con-
straints may be considered equal. Some solutions may be preferred over others, for
instance because they grant greater visibility (i.e., accessibility to more subjects) on
certain selected attributes.
Previous approaches addressing the problem of minimizing information loss
while satisfying some upgrading constraints based the choice of the specific solution
to be returned on the concept of ‘‘optimal’’ classification. Optimality is expressed as
minimization of cost measures determined from the association of weights to attri-
butes and costs to security levels, and where the cost of each solution is the
weighted sum of the classifications assigned. Finding such an optimal solution is
however an NP-hard problem, and existing approaches typically perform exhaus-
tive examination of all possible solutions [30]. Besides suffering from a general
computational intractability, these cost-based approaches are very difficult to use in
practice, as it is generally far from obvious how to manipulate costs to achieve the
desired classification behavior.
We describe here two ways of specifying preference criteria on the minimal solu-
tion to be returned which are intuitive and easy to use. We also illustrate how they
can be included in our approach without increasing the computational cost of
finding the solution.
Soft upper bound constraints. Soft upper bound constraints are, as their name
suggests, upper bound constraints (Definition 2.2), whose satisfaction is not man-
datory, rather they are desiderata on the solution. Intuitively, soft upper bound
constraints express visibility requirements that should be satisfied in the solution, if
possible. Since not all soft constraints may be simultaneously satisfiable, it is con-
venient to consider soft constraints ordered according to their importance. We
assume a list of soft upper bound constraints is provided as input, where the order
in which the constraints appear reflects their importance. Soft upper bound con-
straints are enforced just after the upper bound constraints provided as part of the
problem specification (Section 2). The process for enforcing soft upper bound con-
straints is essentially the same as that for enforcing other upper bound constraints.
The only difference is in the fact that constraints are considered in a specific order,
and that constraints that cannot be satisfied (since they conflict with other upper or
lower bound constraints or with soft upper bound constraints already enforced) can
simply be ignored.
Attribute priority. Another, complementary, approach to specify and compute a
preferred solution is the consideration of explicit priorities between attributes,
which establish their importance in terms of visibility. The algorithm should then
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return a minimal solution that avoids penalizing those attributes whose visibility is
more important.
To the purpose of considering priorities, we first assume that attributes are
prioritized according to a total order [ O, where A [ O B implies that the visibility
of A is more important than the visibility of B. We then extend this order to classi-
fications as follows.
Definition 6.1 (Lexicographic Order). Given a set A of attributes, a classi-
fication lattice L=(L, R ), and a total ordering [ O on the elements of A, a
classification l:AW L lexicographically dominates (with respect to [ O) another
classification lŒ, denoted lR O lŒ, iff -A ¥A : (-AŒ ¥A, AŒ ] A, AŒ [ O A : lŒ(AŒ)=
l(AŒ))S l(A)R lŒ(A). In other words, lR O lŒ iff, for the least attribute A (in the
total order [ O) for which l and lŒ differ, l(A)R lŒ(A).
Based on the above definition, a classification is said to be priority-minimal if it
classifies the attributes whose visibility is more important as low as possible. This
concept is made precise by the following definition.
Definition 6.2 (Priority-Minimal Classification). Given a set A of attribu-
tes, classification lattice L=(L, R ), a set C of classification constraints over A
and L, and a total ordering [ O on the elements of A, a classification l:AW L is
priority-minimal with respect to [ O and C iff (1) l / C; and (2) -lŒ:AW L such
that lŒ / C, lR O lŒS lŒ=l.
It is easy to see that the definition of priority-minimal is stronger than the defini-
tion of minimal (Definition 2.4) and that any classification that is priority-minimal
is also minimal (the converse does not necessarily hold). The proof is trivial by
contradiction. Suppose the implication does not hold and consider a classification l
that is priority-minimal (with respect to some total order [ O on the attributes) but
is not minimal. Then, there exists a classification lŒ ] l such that lŒ / C and lR lŒ,
i.e., l(A)R lŒ(A), -A ¥A. Hence lR O lŒ and lŒ ] l, which contradicts the
assumption that l is priority-minimal.
While the additional control offered by the concept of attribute priority is useful,
the assumption of totally ordered attributes is likely too strong as a practical
requirement. We can imagine instead that attribute priorities will form a partial
order, reflecting the fact that, while some attributes are more important than others
in terms of visibility, there may be no relative importance between other attributes.
We can also imagine the priority order to be only partially specified (on attributes
whose visibility is most important), while all attributes not explicitly mentioned are
assumed to have the same priority (at the top of the attribute ordering). For
instance, referring to the example in Fig. 2, a priority order specification might say
simply that patient [ O illness, meaning that the solution should guarantee first
the maximum visibility of patient, then the maximum visibility of illness, then
the visibility of the other attributes (in no particular order).
To account for this general situation, we extend the definition of priority-minimal
to allow the given priority ordering on the attributesA to be partial. We say that a
total ordering [ O respects a partial ordering [ P if for all A, AŒ ¥A : A [ P AŒS
A [ O AŒ.
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Definition 6.3 (Partial-Priority-Minimal Classification). Given a set A of
attributes, classification lattice L=(L, R ), a set C of classification constraints
over A and L, and a partial ordering [ P on the elements of A, a classification
l:AQ L is partial-priority-minimal with respect to [ P and C iff (1) l / C; and (2)
-lŒ: AQ L such that lŒ / C, (- total orders [ O respecting [ P, lR O lŒ)S lŒ=l.
Definition 6.3 simply extends Definition 6.2 to the case where the ordering on
attributes is a partial order. Again, the condition of partial-priority-minimal is
stronger than simple minimality and any solution satisfying Definition 6.3 is also a
minimal solution. More precisely, it is a minimal solution preferred according to the
visibility constraints specified by the given partial order on attributes.
With minor modifications Algorithm 4.1 can be used to compute partial-priority-
minimal solutions. Here we sketch how such a modified algorithm would work. The
enforcement of upper bound constraints is carried out as in Algorithm 4.1, since
their enforcement is deterministic. For lower bound constraints, the algorithm is
modified to use the incremental lowering process (forward propagation) on attri-
butes in nondecreasing attribute priority order, as determined by the partial order
[ P. More specifically, for some total order [ O on the attributes that respects [ P,
the incremental lowering procedure (try_to_lower) is applied successively to each
attribute from least to greatest according to [ O. The level of each attribute is
lowered as far as possible before proceeding to the next attribute. In this way, each
attribute is assigned the lowest level that satisfies the constraints, subject to the
additional constraint that the levels of attributes (lower in attribute priority order)
already assigned cannot be modified. We state without proof that the solution so
computed is partial-priority-minimal (with respect to [ P). The time complexity of
this computation is the same as that of computing a minimal solution for a set of
cyclic constraints (analyzed in the appendix), O(NASHMc).
When the priority ordering on attributes is only partially specified (i.e., some
subset of the attributes is not prioritized), the performance of the algorithm for
computing partial-priority-minimal solutions can be improved by first executing the
incremental lowering process as described only on the prioritized attributes. Then,
procedure compute_minimal_solution from Algorithm 4.1 can be run unmodified.
Intuitively, running the forward propagation approach on the prioritized attributes
will set their final levels as low as possible. Then, the algorithm will proceed by
executing compute_minimal_solution to determine a classification as before.
Example 6.1. Consider the constraints in Fig. 12 and assume the partial
priority order patient [ P plan, plan [ P doctor (with no other attributes
prioritized). Enforcement of upper constraints is as illustrated in Example 4.1. The
process of enforcing lower bound constraints is illustrated in Fig. 14. The first
phase of the process takes care of priorities, considering the prioritized attributes
(patient, plan, and doctor) in nondecreasing priority order and executing the
lowering (forward propagation process) on them. For each attribute, the table
illustrates the calls to try_to_lower and their possible effects on levels together with
the constraints that caused that effect (column c). After this forward propagation,
the level of the prioritized attributes is final. The level of the other attributes is then
computed evaluating lower bound constraints as already discussed in Example 4.1,
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FIG. 14. Lower bound computation with priorities on the constraints of Fig. 12.
causing the effects illustrated in Fig. 14. The table at the bottom of the figure
reports the levels of the attributes before and after the enforcement of lower bound
constraints.
7. ARBITRARY PARTIAL ORDERS
The results presented thus far are based on the assumption of classification levels
forming a lattice. We consider here the problem of determining a classification if
the security levels do not form a lattice but may instead be an arbitrary poset. It
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turns out that the problem becomes intractable under this new condition, as the
following theorem states.
We define the problem poset-assignment similarly to min-lattice-assignment,
except that the constraint set is restricted to simple constraints, the partial order is
not restricted to be a lattice, and the problem is stated as a decision problem. Given
a partial order (P, \ ) and a set of constraints C, each constraint taking one of two
forms: A \ AŒ, A \ l, where the As are attributes, and l is a constant drawn from P,
is there an assignment from attributes to members of P that satisfies all the
constraints C?
Theorem 7.1. poset-assignment is np-complete.
Proof. The proof is presented in the Appendix. L
8. RELATED WORK
Inference problems have been studied extensively in the context of multilevel
database systems. Most inference research addresses detection of inference channels
within a database or at query processing time. Initial proposals in the first category
[12, 24, 28, 33] analyze the database schema to locate inference channels based on
semantic relationships between attributes. For instance, DISSECT [24], analyzes
the database schema to determine inference paths due to sequences of foreign key
relationships, and signals the database administrator of a possible inference
problem whenever two database relations are connected by multiple paths at dif-
ferent classifications. These approaches are mostly intended to support multilevel
schema design by identifying possible inference channels for the database adminis-
trator rather than automatically solving them. More recent approaches [7, 11, 17,
20, 37] extend the inference analysis to the consideration of database content (finer-
grained inference control) and possibly external information. In some sense, these
approaches are complementary to ours, as the information produced by them could
be used as input to our approach for the definition of classification constraints. The
proposals in the second category [10, 18, 21, 27, 34] evaluate database transactions
to determine whether they lead to illegal inferences and, if so, disallow the query.
The solutions investigated are not applicable in our context, where constraint pro-
cessing is executed offline for the purpose of producing a classified database that
prevents improper information leakage without the need of (expensive and often
impractical or infeasible) runtime control and logging.
The work closest to ours is that of Su and Ozsoyoglu [30] and that of Stickel
[29]. Su and Ozsoyoglu [30] consider the problem of upgrading data to block
inference channels due to functional and multivalued dependencies. Their approach
takes as input a set of attributes together with a proposed classification for them
and a set of functional dependencies assumed to cause inference. It returns an
alternative inference channel-free classification for the attributes, obtained by
upgrading the classifications provided as input. Intuitively, each functional depen-
dency corresponds to a lower bound constraint requiring the least upper bound of
the security levels of a given set of attributes to dominate the security levels of the
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attribute functionally dependent on them. Minimization of information loss due to
possible upgrading is determined based on the following optimality criteria. Each
attribute at each possible given level is associated with a weight, based on the usage
and importance of the attribute to the application. The optimal solution to be
produced is the one that satisfies all the constraints while minimizing the difference
between the total weight of attributes before and after the security level adjustment.
Determining such a solution is an NP-hard problem, and the algorithm proposed in
[30] finds it at the price of executing an exhaustive search among all possible solu-
tions. For the same problem, Stickel [29] within the context of DISSECT [24],
computes the optimal solution by applying the Davis-Putnam approach to theorem
proving; where the Davis-Putnam procedure is used to produce all the minimal
solutions to a set of constraints, from which the optimal can then be chosen. Apart
from the same computational complexity concerns associated with the other
approaches mentioned, the work in [29, 30] has several drawbacks. First, it is
generally far from obvious how to manipulate costs to achieve the desired classifi-
cation behavior. Second, the proposed approaches work only under the assumption
of totally ordered security levels. For the simple case of classification composed of
pairs Osecurity level, set of categoriesP, Stickel suggests their approach could be
applied by exploding the problems into one problem for each possible category in
the category set. However, details are not given there. Also, such a solution would
add another dimension to the computational complexity of finding the optimal
solution. The notion of minimal classification used in this paper was first proposed
in [6], within the content-based classification of existing data repositories. There,
the approach to the determination of a preferred minimal solution still computes all
the possible classifications, thus bearing an exponential cost, and it, like others, is
limited to the consideration of totally ordered security levels. As a final remark,
none of the previous work considered upper bound constraints.
9. CONCLUSIONS
We have examined the problem of computing an assignment of security levels to
database attributes from a set of classification constraints. The constraints we con-
sider permit the specification of relationships between the security levels of a set of
one or more attributes and the level of another attribute or an explicit level. In
contrast to previous proposals investigating the NP-hard problem of determining
optimal solutions (with respect to some cost measure), we provide an efficient
algorithm for computing one solution with (pointwise) minimal information loss.
Our approach efficiently handles complex cyclic constraints and guarantees a
minimal solution in all cases in quadratic time, but also provides linear time
performance for the common case of acyclic constraints.
The work presented in this paper leaves space for further work. Work to be
investigated includes, the investigation of criteria and possible heuristics towards
the determination of a possible preferred solution; the investigation of incremental
solutions to the consideration of updates to the classification constraints; the inves-
tigation of the applicability of the approach to nonmandatory policies and its
possible extensions to discretionary domains.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS
A.1. Correctness of Algorithm 4.1
We first establish several lemmas used in the proof of the main theorem. The
proofs often refer to immediate constraints on an attribute, by which we mean
either lower bound constraints in which the attribute appears on the left-hand side
or upper bound constraints in which the attribute is on the right-hand side.
Lemma A.1 establishes the correctness of compute_upper_bounds, showing that it
succeeds in generating an initial classification mapping that satisfies the input
constraints if and only if the constraints are consistent.
Lemma A.1. Let C=Clower 2 Cupper be a set of classification constraints over a set
of attributesA and a classification latticeL=(L, R ).
(i) If compute_upper_bounds terminates with failure, then C is inconsistent.
(ii) If compute_upper_bounds terminates with success, then the computed clas-
sification mapping l:AW L satisfies C (l/ C), and hence, C is consistent.
(iii) Procedure compute_upper_bounds always terminates.
Proof. (i) We first prove that the following property holds of the current clas-
sification mapping l throughout the computation of compute_upper_bounds:
For all mappings lŒ such that l R^ lŒ, there exists a constraint c ¥ C such that lŒ /^ c.
(A.1.1)
In other words, at all times in compute_upper_bounds it is not possible to change the
levels of any attributes to higher or incomparable levels without violating at least
one constraint. We prove this property by induction, showing that if it holds before
the modification of any l(A), it also holds after the change. At the start of the
procedure, l(A)= 2 for all attributes A, and the property trivially holds, since
there is no mapping that l does not dominate. Now, there are two points in
compute_upper_bounds at which attributes’ levels may be modified. The first is at
the start of compute_upper_bounds itself, where each upper bound constraint is
enforced, and the second is in the subprocedure upper_bound. In both cases, the
modification results from processing a constraint c of the form (lhs, A), where
A ¥A, and the level assigned to A is the greatest lower bound (glb) of the level of
lhs and l(A). Let l denote the level of lhs under l, and let lŒ=l X l(A). Let lŒ=l
except that lŒ(A)=lŒ. Note that lŒ is the mapping that results from ensuring the
satisfaction of c. We analyze two cases according to the possible relationships
between l and l(A).
Case 1. lR l(A). In this case, lŒ=l(A) and lŒ=l. Hence, l is not modified,
and the property continues to hold.
Case 2. l R^ l(A). In this case, l(A)P lŒ. Let lœ be any mapping such that
lŒ R^ lœ. Suppose lŒ(A) R^ lœ(A). If l(A)R lœ(A), then l R^ lœ(A), since lŒ(A)=lŒ is
the glb of l and l(A). Hence, lœ /^ c. Otherwise, l(A) R^ lœ(A). Hence, l R^ lœ, and
by hypothesis, there exists cŒ ¥ C such that lœ /^ cŒ. In either case, the property holds
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for the modified mapping lŒ. Suppose instead that lŒ(A)R lœ(A). Then, for some
AŒ ] A, lŒ(AŒ) R^ lœ(AŒ). Since lŒ=l except on A, we have lŒ(AŒ)=l(AŒ),
l(AŒ) R^ lœ(AŒ), and hence, l R^ lœ. By hypothesis, then, there exists cŒ ¥ C such that
lœ /^ cŒ, and the property again holds for the modified mapping lŒ. This establishes
Property A.1.1.
Suppose now that upper_bound (and hence, compute_upper_bounds) terminates
with failure. This means that a constraint c=(lhs, rhs), such that rhs ¥ L is a
security level, was found not to be satisfied; that is, l /^ c. Since rhs is fixed, the
only way to satisfy the constraint would be to suitably modify l for some attri-
bute(s) in lhs. Let lŒ:AW L be any mapping from attributes in A to levels in L.
If lR lŒ, then lŒ /^ c, since l /^ c. Otherwise, l R^ lŒ. By the property just proved
(A.1.1), there exists a constraint cŒ ¥ C such that lŒ /^ c. Hence, for any mapping lŒ,
there exists a constraint that cannot be satisfied, and therefore C is inconsistent.
(ii) Assume that compute_upper_bounds terminates successfully. We show that
the computed mapping l satisfies C by induction on SCC index. That is, we show
that, if at the start of iteration i (of the loop over SCCs in compute_upper_bounds) l
satisfies all immediate constraints on all attributes in all SCCs of index less than i,
then at the end of that iteration l satisfies all immediate constraints on all attributes
in all SCCs of index less than or equal to i.
We begin by noting that before the first iteration (i=1), l / Cupper, since for each
constraint c ¥ Cupper of the form (l, A), l(A) is assigned l(A) X l, so that lR l(A).
Now consider an arbitrary iteration i. The following properties are readily estab-
lished:
1. Every constraint on every attribute in scc[i] is checked for satisfaction
under l. This follows from the fact that compute_upper_bounds calls upper_bound
on all attributes A for which visit[A] is 0, and visit[A] is set to a nonzero value
only by upper_bound itself.
2. For any constraint c of the form (lhs, rhs) (on the attribute A being pro-
cessed) found to be violated by l, l(rhs) is assigned the glb of its current level and
that of lhs, satisfying c. Furthermore, any other constraint with the same rhs
remains satisfied, if it was previously, since the new level of rhs is dominated by its
previous level. Now, from the properties of the DFS procedures [32], we know that
the SCC index of rhs must be greater than or equal to that of A. If it is equal, a
recursive call to upper_bound on rhs ensures that all immediate constraints on it are
(re)checked.
3. From the properties of the SCCs computed by the DFS procedures, we
know that the levels of any attributes in an SCC of index less than i are unmodified
after iteration i, since such attributes are not reachable by any constraints on attri-
butes in scc[i].
4. Since the levels assigned to attributes can only be lowered, the upper
bound constraints remain satisfied.
From properties 1, 2, and 4, we can conclude that all immediate constraints on all
attributes in scc[i] are satisfied after iteration i. From properties 3 and 4, we can
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conclude that all constraints on all attributes in SCCs of index less than i remain
satisfied. Hence, the induction step is proved.
(iii) Procedure compute_upper_bounds is composed of three loops over finite
sets. Termination of the procedure is straightforward to establish, except perhaps
for the recursive subprocedure upper_bound, called in the third loop, for each SCC
scc[i]. upper_bound(A, i) is called recursively only when an attribute A in the SCC
being processed (scc[i]) is assigned a level strictly lower than the one it currently
has. Each attribute can be lowered only a finite number of times (bounded by the
height of the lattice), and the number of attributes in each SCC is finite. Hence, the
number of times upper_bound can be called in an SCC is finite. L
Lemma A.1 shows that, if the algorithm continues beyond the end of
compute_upper_bounds, then the remainder of the algorithm starts from a point at
which l satisfies the constraints (and otherwise the constraints are inconsistent).
The remaining lemmas are used in the proof of the main theorem to show that key
parts of the final phase of the algorithm (compute_minimal_solution) preserve the
property that, after every modification, l remains a solution. First, we prove
Lemma A.2, which shows that arguments about the satisfaction of generated clas-
sification assignments can be made locally. That is, it establishes that, if any
changes to a solution mapping that are limited to a subset of the attributes result in
satisfaction of the immediate constraints on those attributes, then the modified
mapping remains a solution for all constraints.
Lemma A.2. Given (1) a set C of constraints on a set A of attributes and (2) a
subset AŒ of A, let l be an assignment of levels to attributes such that l/ C and lŒ
be an assignment such that lR lŒ and that differs from l only on attributes in AŒ.
Let CŒ denote the set of immediate constraints on attributes in AŒ, that is, CŒ=
{(lhs, rhs) ¥ C | lhs 5AŒ ]”}. Then, lŒ / C if and only if lŒ / CŒ.
Proof. (If): Assume that lŒ satisfies CŒ. Let c=(lhs, rhs) be an arbitrary
constraint in C. If c ¥ CŒ, then by assumption, lŒ / c. Otherwise, c ¨ CŒ, so
lhs 5AŒ=”, and thus, lub{lŒ(lhs)}=lub{l(lhs)}. Now, l(rhs)R lŒ(rhs) and
lub{lŒ(lhs)}=lub{l(lhs)}R l(rhs)R lŒ(rhs), and hence, lŒ / c.
(Only if): If lŒ satisfies C, lŒ satisfies any subset of C. L
The following lemma shows that any change to a solution l resulting from the
output of procedure try_to_lower in Algorithm 4.1 preserves l as a solution.
Lemma A.3. Let AS be the set of pairs of the form (AŒ, lŒ) returned by Try(A, l).
If AS ]” the assignment obtained by replacing l(AŒ) with l(AŒ)=lŒ for all
(AŒ, lŒ) ¥ AS satisfies all immediate lower bound constraints on attributes in scc[i],
where scc[i] is the SCC containing A.
Proof. The following properties are readily established.
1. When a pair (AŒ, lŒ) ¥ Tocheck is selected, all immediate lower bound
constraints on AŒ are checked for satisfaction.
2. If any constraint c of the form (lhs, rhs) is found to be violated, either the
right-hand side is done and cannot be satisfied (in which case try_to_lower returns
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”) or a pair of the form (rhs, lœ) is added to Tocheck, where l is the greatest level
that can be assigned to rhs and still satisfy all constraints checked up to that point.
3. From the established properties of the DFS procedures [32], we know that
every attribute AŒ in the SCC containing AŒ is reachable from AŒ.
4. For any attribute AŒ, at most one pair of the form (AŒ, lŒ) can exist in
Tocheck or Tolower (but not both) at any time. This follows immediately from the
fact that, whenever a pair involving AŒ is added to one set, any pair involving AŒ in
the other set (if one exists) is first removed.
5. For any pair of the form (AŒ, lŒ) ¥ Tocheck and any pair of the form
(AŒ, lœ) subsequently added to Tocheck, lŒR lœ.
6. Every pair (AŒ, lŒ) ¥ Tocheck is eventually selected.
Properties 1, 2, 3, and 6 together show that any constraint that could be violated by
any assignment modification (represented in Tolower) is checked, and if possible,
another modification is made to satisfy the constraint. Properties 1 through 4
together show that, at all times in try_to_lower the modifications to l represented in
Tolower are such that l satisfies all immediate constraints on all attributes in the
SCC containing A, provided that all pairs in Tocheck also represent satisfying
assignments. At the end of the procedure, Tocheck is empty, so the lemma
holds. L
Theorem 5.1 (Correctness). Algorithm 4.1 solves min-lattice-assignment.
That is, given a set C of classification constraints over a set A of attributes and a
classification lattice L=(L, R ), Algorithm 4.1 generates a minimal classification
mapping l:AW L that satisfies C, or terminates with failure if the set C is incon-
sistent.
Proof. We show that compute_minimal_solution produces an assignment l that
(i) satisfies C if one exists; (ii) any attribute A for which done[A]=true has been
assigned a minimal level that satisfies its constraints. We show this by induction on
the outermost loop of compute_minimal_solution on SCCs. Initially l assigns 2 to
every attribute, which trivially satisfies all lower bound constraints in C, and for
every l ¥ L we have the assignments l(l)=l and done[l]=true, which trivially
satisfies the minimality requirement.
By Lemma A.1, compute_upper_bounds always terminates and returns failure if
the constraints are inconsistent, otherwise producing an assignment which satisfies
C (but which is usually not minimal). Inductively, we assume that at the start of an
iteration of the outermost loop l is a solution, and that any attribute marked done
has been assigned a minimal satisfying level, and we must show that l is a solution
at the end of that iteration, and any attribute marked done at the end of that itera-
tion has been assigned a minimal satisfying level. By Lemma A.2 it suffices to show
that (1) l at the end of any iteration differs from l at the start only on attributes of
a given SCC, (2) the level assigned by l to any attribute is never raised, and (3) all
direct constraints on attributes of that SCC are satisfied at the end of any iteration.
Let i be the SCC index in the outermost loop of compute_minimal_solution and S
be the list scc[i]. We argue by induction on the second-level loop (For A ¥ scc[i]),
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and show that l satisfies C at the end of each iteration of this inner loop, and
further that the minimality requirement is met for all attributes that are done. Let A
be an arbitrary attribute in S. Consider Constr[A]. If every (lhs, rhs) ¥ Constr[A] is
such that done[rhs]=true, we simply take the least upper bound of a set of pre-
determined levels, and since we are working in a lattice, a unique least upper bound
l exists. Otherwise, there is at least one (lhs, rhs) ¥ Constr[A] such that done[rhs]=
false. So, after processing each c ¥ Constr[A], done[A]=false, and we proceed
from the initialization of DSet. At this point in the computation l holds a lower
bound on the level that may be assigned to A, l(A)R l, and DSet is initialized to
the set of levels immediately below l(A) and that dominate l. We argue that l
satisfies C at the end of any iteration of the inner while-loop, and that the mini-
mality requirement is met. If try_to_lower fails for every lœ ¥ DSet, no assignments
in l are modified, and thus, C remains satisfied, and since all lower levels failed, we
have found a minimal assignment for A. Otherwise, by Lemma A.3, try_to_lower
returns a set of pairs of the form (AŒ, lŒ), where AŒ ¥ scc[i], l(AŒ)R lŒ, and such
that replacing l(AŒ) by l(AŒ)=lŒ for all such AŒ satisfies all constraints on attri-
butes in scc[i]. The inner while-loop concludes by making this replacement and
resetting DSet to levels immediately below l(A). Hence, l satisfies C at the end of
each iteration of the while-loop, and any attribute A for which done[A]=true has
been assigned a minimal level that satisfies its constraints. By induction l satisfies C
at the end of the enclosing for-loop, and thus at the end of the outermost loop.
Termination. There are two aspects of termination that are not obvious once
one takes into consideration the termination argument in Lemma A.1. First, the
while-loop at the end of compute_minimal_solution terminates because DSet is
finite, and in each iteration every level in DSet is strictly dominated by any level in
the preceding iteration. Thus, as long as try_to_lower terminates, the while-loop will
terminate, because either the bottom of the lattice is reached or because every level
tried in one iteration fails. Second, it is not immediately obvious that the repeat-
loop in try_to_lower terminates. Note that it continues as long as the set Tocheck is
not empty. In each iteration of the loop one pair is removed from Tocheck and
added to Tolower. However, for any attribute, there can be at most one pair
involving that attribute in either Tocheck or Tolower. It is possible that, for some
pair (A, l) ¥ Tolower, a pair (A, lŒ) will be added to Tocheck. If so, l must strictly
dominate lŒ, so the number of times a pair involving the same attribute may be
entered into Tocheck is bounded by the height of the lattice. L
A.2. Algorithm 4.1 is Low-order Polynomial
In the complexity analysis we adopt the following notational conventions with
respect to a given instance (A,L, C) of min-lattice-assignment: NA (=|A|)
denotes the number of attributes in A; NL (=|L|) denotes the number of security
levels in L; NC (=|C|) denotes the number of constraints in C; S=
; (lhs, rhs) ¥ C (|lhs|+1) denotes the total size of all constraints in C; H denotes the
height of L; B denotes the maximum number of immediate predecessors (‘‘branch-
ing factor’’) of any element inL; c denotes the maximum cost of computing the lub
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or glb of any two elements in L. Define M to be maximum, for all paths from the
top to the bottom of a lattice, of the sum of the branching factor of each element of
the path. M is no greater than BH, and is also no greater than the size of L
(number of elements+size of the immediate successor relation).
Theorem 5.2 (Complexity). Algorithm 4.1 solves any instance (A,L, C) of the
problem min-lattice-assignment in O(NASHMc) time, and, if the set of constraints
C is acyclic, in O(SMc) time. Therefore, min-lattice-assignment is solvable in
polynomial time.
Proof. For the analysis, we consider two cases: (1) C is acyclic, and (2) C is
cyclic. We begin by noting that the preprocessing steps in main, apart from dfs_visit
and dfs_back_visit, require (in total) time proportional to S+NL. Procedures
dfs_visit and dfs_back_visit themselves are simply a minor adaptation of Tarjan’s
linear-time SCC computing algorithm [32], and require time proportional to S. In
the acyclic case, compute_upper_bounds processes all constraints in C once for each
attribute on the left-hand side, and, for each constraint, may perform one lub and
one glb operation. Thus, it requires time proportional to S+NCc, which is certainly
O(Sc). In the cyclic case, compute_upper_bounds may check all constraints in C
multiple times per attribute. Whenever the level of the attribute A on the right side
of some constraint is lowered and is in the same SCC as the attribute on the left
side for which the constraint is being checked, all constraints on A must be
rechecked. Since this rechecking is done only upon lowering the level of the attri-
bute, the number of times an attribute’s constraints can be rechecked is bounded by
H, the height of the lattice. Thus, in the cyclic case the enforcement of upper bound
constraints can be accomplished in O(SHc) time. Overall, the time complexity for
all parts of the algorithm before compute_minimal_solution is O(Sc) in the acyclic
case and O(SHc) in the cyclic case.
It remains to determine the complexity of compute_partial_lubs and compute_
minimal_solution. For each constraint (lhs, rhs), compute_partial_lubs computes and
stores a number of partial lubs requiring O(|lhs|) space and O(|lhs| c) time. Overall,
the time complexity of compute_partial_lubs is O(Sc).
For compute_minimal_solution note that the effect of the three nested for-loops is
to consider every attribute in each of its constraints, which requires no more than S
iterations of the innermost loop, while the containing loop iterates NA times
overall. In the acyclic case, note that every attribute is its own SCC. When consid-
ering any attribute A in compute_minimal_solution, then, the computation of the
level of any attribute appearing on the rhs of any constraint on A will have been
completed (done[rhs] is always true), and the DSet computation and while-loop are
never performed. Thus, apart from constant-time initializations in the second for-
loop, the only cost to consider for the acyclic case is that of the innermost for-loop.
For each constraint, either a lub operation is performed, or possibly a lub operation
and a call to minlevel. The minlevel procedure first performs several constant-time
initializations and one lub operation. The remainder of minlevel considers overall at
most M security levels, each involving a lub operation. The time complexity of
minlevel, then, is O(Mc). Since the cost of minlevel is at least as high as that of a lub
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operation, the worst-case cost of the inner loop is when all S iterations involve
minlevel, O(SMc), which, for acyclic constraints, dominates the time complexity of
all other parts of the algorithm.
For cyclic constraints, the cost due to the innermost for-loop of compute_
minimal_solution cannot be greater than that of the acyclic case. In the containing
loop (the loop over attributes), the while-loop may execute for every attribute in the
SCC. Like minlevel, the while-loop considers at most HB security levels, each
involving the try_to_lower computation. In the worst case, try_to_lower processes
the constraints for all attributes in the SCC. More precisely, it processes the con-
straints of every attribute in the SCC not marked done. The number of such attri-
butes decreases by one after each invocation of try_to_lower, but on average,
try_to_lower may process as many as half the constraints involved in the SCC.
Now, it can happen that, for some pair (A, l) ¥ Tolower and level lŒ, (A, l) is
removed from Tolower and (A, lŒ) added to Tocheck, implying the reprocessing of
constraints on A. For any attribute, this reintroduction into Tocheck can happen at
most H times, since lŒ must be strictly lower than l. For each constraint considered,
the lub of all attributes in the lhs is computed, requiring time proportional to
|lhs| · c. Assuming suitable data structures for constant-time operations involving
Tolower and Tocheck, the only remaining nonconstant cost comes from at most two
glb operations. The time complexity of try_to_lower, then, is O(HSc), and that of
the whileloop in compute_minimal_solution is O(HMSc). Over all attributes in the
SCC, the time complexity of compute_minimal_solution due to the while-loop is
O(NAHMSc), which dominates the cost due to the innermost for-loop of
compute_minimal_solution. L
A.3. Classification Assignment in a Poset is NP-complete
We define the problem poset-assignment similarly to min-lattice-assignment,
except that the constraint set is restricted to simple constraints, the partial order is
not restricted to be a lattice, and the problem is stated as a decision problem. Given
a partial order (P, \ ) and a set of constraints C, each constraint taking one of two
forms: A \ AŒ, A \ l, where the As are attributes, and l is a constant drawn from P,
is there an assignment from attributes to members of P that satisfies all the
constraints C?
Theorem 7.1 [poset-assignment is np-complete.]
Informally, to see why poset-assignment is a hard problem, consider a poset of
security levels with four elements with two upper elements each dominating the two
lower elements, as depicted in Fig. A.1b. If an attribute is known to dominate the
two lower elements, in the final analysis that attribute must be assigned to one of
the two upper elements, and thus a choice must be made. Multiple such choices
may result in an exponential number of possibilities. Below we sketch a proof using
this kind of choice to encode propositional truth or falsity in satisfiability problems.
We give a polynomial reduction from 3-sat, demonstrating np-hardness. We first
define a partial order (the security levels), beginning with the empty set C, and for
each clause Clausei of the form Pi1 KPi2 KPi3 , where each literal Pij is either the
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FIG. A.1. Poset for (pKq)N (qK r¯) (a), and four-element poset (b).
propositional variable pij or its negation pij , we add the element named Ci to C,
and further add seven more elements to C, one for each truth assignment that
satisfies the clause. For convenience, we name these seven elements by simply con-
catenating the names of the clauses with the literals they contain, using overbars to
denote negation: ‘‘CiPi1Pi2Pi3 ,’’ ‘‘CiPi1Pi2Pi3 ,’’ ‘‘CiPi1Pi2Pi3 ,’’ etc. For each proposi-




j ,’’ and ‘‘p
−
j .’’ Intui-
tively, these stand for the jth proposition being undecided, true, and false, respec-
tively.
With the above set of constants, we define a partial order relation \ on them as
follows. We define the relation Rprop to include, for each propositional variable pj,
p+j \ p ?j and p−j \ p ?j . We define the relation Rclause to include, for each element of
the form CiPi1Pi2Pi3 in C, Ci \ CiPi1Pi2Pi3 (seven for each clause). We also define the
relation Rtrue to include, for each element of the form CiPi1Pi2Pi3 in C,
P+ij \ CiPi1Pi2Pi3 for each j, 1 [ j [ 3, such that Pij=pij (i.e., pij occurs as a positive
literal in the corresponding clause). Similarly, we define the relation Rfalse to include,
for each element of the form CiPi1Pi2Pi3 in C, P
−
ij \ CiPi1Pi2Pi3 for each j, 1 [ j [ 3,
such that Pij=pij (i.e., pij occurs as a negative literal in the corresponding clause).
The final partial order of interest will be made up of elements of C, related by
Rprop 2 Rclause 2 Rtrue 2 Rfalse. There are eight (=23) elements in C for each 3-sat
clause, plus three elements for each propositional variable. The partial order has
height one. Figure A.1a displays the partial order produced for the sat problem
(pKq)N (qK r¯). Clauses of length two were used in the figure to improve reada-
bility.
To simplify our arguments about the reduction, we first define a set of con-
straints that does not conform to the syntactic restrictions of poset-assignment, in
that constraints of the form l \ A (upper bound constraints) are used. We later
show how these constraints can be replaced with an equivalent set that does
conform to the definition of poset-assignment. To form the constraints, we use a
set of attributes, one wpj for each propositional variable pj, and one wci for each
clause Clausei. We define a set of inequations Cclause to include, for each clause
Clausei, the constraint Ci \ wci, and for each literal Pij in that clause, wpij \ wci.
We also define a set of inequations Cprop to include, for each propositional variable
pj, the constraint wpi \ p ?i . Thus there are four constraints in Cclause per 3-sat
clause, and one constraint in Cprop for each propositional variable. Continuing with
our simple example, (pKq)N (qK r¯), the inequations Cclause={C1 \ wc1, wpp \ wc1,
wpq \ wc1, C2 \ wc2, wpq \ wc2, wpr \ wc2}, and Cprop={wpp \ p?, wpq \ q?, wpr \ r?}.
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We claim that the poset-assignment problem given by the partial order
(C, Rprop 2 Rclause 2 Rtrue 2 Rfalse), with the constraints Cprop 2 Cclause has a solution if
and only if the original 3-sat problem has one. This may be observed by noting
that every attribute wci must be assigned some ciPi1Pi2Pi3 , since wci must be lower
than Ci and some propositions. Also, the only CiPi1Pi2Pi3 that exist in C correspond
to assignments of propositional variables that satisfy the clause. Further, wpj must
be assigned either p+j or p
−
j . We claim there is a correspondence between a propo-
sitional variable pj being assigned true (or false, resp.) in the 3-sat problem, and




j , resp.) in the poset-assignment problem. Thus one may
see that a solution to the 3-sat problem may be derived from any solution to the
constructed poset-assignment problem and vice versa.
Note that the constraints of the form Ci \ wci are upper bound constraints and
do not conform to the restrictions on the constraints in the definition of poset-
assignment. Each such constraint can be replaced by a set of constraints of the
required form as follows. For each Clausei, create one new attribute wui and seven
constraints of the form wui \ CiPi1Pi2Pi3 , one for each of the seven clause elements
for Clausei in the partial order. These lower bound constraints have the effect of
forcing wui to have only one possible assignment in the partial order, namely Ci.
Now, the constraints of the form Ci \ wci used in the reduction can be replaced by
the equivalent constraints wui \ wci, which are of the form required by the defini-
tion of poset-assignment.
Finally, we note that poset-assignment is in np, since we can guess a solution
and check it in polynomial time.
Using results of Pratt and Tiuryn [22], this result can be improved to apply to
small fixed partial orders, including the four-element partial order of security levels
with two upper elements each dominating the two lower elements (Fig. A.1b).
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